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Abstract 
 
Higher education systems in competitive environments generally present top universities, 
that are able to attract top scientists, top students and public and private financing, with 
notable socio-economic benefits in their region. The same does not hold true for non-
competitive systems. In this study we will measure the dispersion of research performance 
within and between universities in the Italian university system, typically non-competitive. 
We will also investigate the level of correlation that occurs between performance in 
research and its dispersion in universities. The findings may represent a first benchmark for 
similar studies in other nations. Furthermore, they lead to policy indications, questioning 
the effectiveness of selective funding of universities based on national research assessment 
exercises. The field of observation is composed of all Italian universities active in the hard 
sciences. Research performance will be evaluated using a bibliometric approach, through 
publications indexed in the Web of Science between 2004 and 2008. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In every field of human activity there are certain individuals who distinguish 
themselves by particular competencies, attitudes and interests, generally translating into 
outstanding levels of performance. Similarly, in every economic sector there are certain 
organizations, public or private, for-profit or not-for-profit, which consistently 
demonstrate top performance, in turn leading to a reputation which is likely to become a 
distinctive competence of the organization. These organizations generally excel at every 
link in the chain of value, thanks to quality of their personnel and the strategic and 
organizational capacity of their management. The fundamental key to their long-term 
success is a capacity to attract, develop and retain talent, meaning the best representatives 
of the work force in each function. Research organizations (universities and institutions), 
whether public or private, will not escape this rule as long as they operate in competitive 
environments. The level of domestic competition in higher education is determined by 
several contextual elements, from cultural practices to political legitimization of the 
system. One of the fundamental determinants of competitive intensity is undoubtedly the 
typology of funding and related incentives, at macro, meso and micro levels. In countries 
where government funding of universities represents a large share of total budget and is 
allocated with the intention of ensuring sufficiency of resources, competition among 
universities will likely be low in intensity. On the contrary, in nations where extra-
governmental financing is significant and the public allocation is essentially based on 
merit, the environment is likely to be more competitive (Geuna and Martin, 2003). Over 
time, competition should lead to the development of distinctive competencies and to a 
subsequent competitive advantage of some organizations over all the others, meaning that 
in competitive environments it is possible to observe more marked performance 
differences among universities, and a mapping of the higher education industry into 
strategic groups. 
Auranen and Nieminen (2010) classified the higher education systems of such 
countries as Germany, Sweden and Denmark (the present authors would also add Italy) as 
non-competitive. In these nations, the distinction of the different levels of excellence 
among universities is not immediate. On the contrary, in countries such as the United 
States, United Kingdom and Australia, which fall in the competitive category, few would 
have difficulty in identifying the best research universities. These universities are in 
competition with one another to bring in, from at home and abroad, the best researchers 
and teaching professors, the best technical-administrative personnel, best students, 
donations and public and private financing for research. Their reputations and 
competitive advantages are reflected as much in the salary levels and status that they 
succeed in providing as in the willingness of students to pay tuition fees that are well over 
average. Local and national governments have every interest in developing and 
cultivating champion institutions. In fact, the social and economic benefits for the nation 
and home region of a prestigious university have been soundly demonstrated (Rosemberg 
and Nelson, 1994, Pressman et al., 1995; Fritsch and Slavtchev, 2006). Governments 
should thus provide the conditions for development of competitive environments, leading 
to continuous improvement in the entire higher education system, and the emergence of 
top universities. 
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It is no accident that, in recent years, an increasing number of nations have begun 
regular national exercises for research evaluation, permitting the allocation of funds on 
the basis of performance criteria and the stimulation of greater research productivity. 
These exercises are generally based on the peer-review method, implying the 
evaluation of only a share of the entire research output of each university. Rankings for 
the universities are drawn up on the basis of the average quality of the research products 
as submitted by the institutions, and not on productivity. Performances of universities are 
compared at discipline level and not at individual level. 
If the objective of government is to stimulate competition among universities, and so 
lead to the development of top universities that can compete internationally and produce 
the relevant socio-economic benefits, then one of the indicators to monitor over time, 
other than performance itself, is the degree of concentration of performance within 
universities. The less research performance is dispersed within universities then the 
greater is the probability of having top universities that are able to compete at the 
international level. This would indicate that the competitive environment has led to the 
formation of a system of universities with marked differences in performance, and thus 
the concentration of top scientists in top universities. In the American system of higher 
education, which appears to be among the most competitive, presenting a significant 
number of recognized universities able to attract resources and students from around the 
world, we expect that the average performance of researchers in these top universities 
would be very high, but that the variability, and thus the concentration, would be low. 
Universities of average level would be expected to show an average performance, 
perhaps with points of excellence in one or two disciplines, but again with a quite low 
concentration. To achieve balanced regional development, an additional policy objective 
could be that the top universities be distributed quite uniformly throughout the nation. 
To date, the literature does not offer detailed analyses of the concentration of 
performance in university systems. In 1974, Allison and Stewart detected a highly 
skewed distribution of productivity (publications and citations) among 2,172 scientists 
working in US academic departments. The authors pointed out the presence of 
accumulative advantage, so that “because of feedback through recognition and resources, 
highly productive scientists maintain or increase their productivity, while scientists who 
produce very little produce even less later on”. Daniel and Fisch (1990), in their review 
on the history of research performance evaluation in German universities, stressed the 
importance to take into account concentration of performance: in their opinion, when the 
department is the unit of analysis, the evaluator “should distinguish between those with 
'collective strength' and those with 'individual strength' by computing some measure of 
concentration”. However, the paper provides no empirical evidence about concentration: 
the authors make only reference to one German leading psychology department and recall 
fundamental regularities of the distribution of scientific productivity, already pointed out 
in pioneering works of Lotka (1926) and De Solla Price (1971). The lack of studies on 
concentration of research performance is easily understandable: realizing such analysis 
requires the measurement of performance at the level of single scientists, which can be 
hardly achieved on large populations. Meanwhile, except for Abramo and D’Angelo 
(2011), the bibliometric exercises available in the literature have been limited to single 
institutions or disciplines (Kalaitzidakis et al. 2003; Macri and Dipendra, 2006; 
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Gonçalves et al., 2009; Costas, 2010), and have never entered into the comparative 
analysis of the degree of concentration of performance in the institutions examined. 
What we propose for this work is exactly this measurement of the degree of 
concentration of performance, in the hard sciences for Italian universities. We will 
subsequently compare the variability of performance within universities to that between 
universities. Finally, we will examine the level of correlation between degree of 
concentration and average level of performance. Through the findings of our analyses, we 
aim at providing policy indications on the risks of assigning public funds to universities 
on the basis of the outcomes of national research assessment exercises. Furthermore, we 
hope to stimulate similar analyses in other national contexts in order to demonstrate the 
assumption that non-competitive higher-education systems differ from competitive ones 
in terms of concentration of performance within and between universities. 
The next section of the paper presents a summary description of the Italian university 
system. Section 3 describes the methodology adopted, the dataset and indicators used. 
Section 4 presents the results, with discussion. The last section presents the pertinent 
conclusions from the work, with the authors’ comments. 
 
 
2. The Italian university system 
 
In Italy, the Ministry of Education, Universities and Research (MIUR) recognizes a 
total of 95 universities, with the authority to issue legally-recognized degrees. With only 
rare exceptions these are public universities. These universities are largely financed 
through non-competitive allocation from the MIUR, although this share of income is 
decreasing, as seen in the reduction from 61.5% in 2001 to 55.5% in 2007 (MIUR, 2010). 
In keeping with the “welfare state” view that higher education is a public good which 
should be made accessible to all, from the wealthy to the less advantaged, the government 
imposes a price-cap for tuition fees. The effective fees varies from student to student, 
since fees are calculated according to family income. However they are very low, roughly 
1,000 Euro per academic year2, and as such provide 12.5% of total university income. 
Further financing from the MIUR, for research projects on a competitive basis3, 
represents an additional 8.8% of income. Other public and private financing for research 
projects, obtained on a competitive basis, adds a further 17.0% of total income. Income 
deriving from technological transfer is negligible, given the very limited practice of 
Italian universities to carry out patenting and licensing (Abramo, 2007). Donations to 
universities are not a feature of the Italian cultural tradition and are also negligible. Up to 
2009, the core funding by government was input oriented, meaning that it was distributed 
to universities in a manner intended to satisfy the needs for resources of each and all, in 
function of their size and activities. It was only following the first national research 
evaluation exercise (VTR), conducted between 2004 and 2006, that a minimal share, 
                                                 
2 As a comparison, annual tuition fees at Oxford University are 4,000 Euro; at Stanford University annual 
fees are approximately 30,500 Euro 
3 In the Italian university sphere there is great skepticism that the financing of research projects by the 
public sector is truly determined on a merit basis, due to a history of strongly-rooted favoritism practices in 
the environment and perceptions of poor effectiveness in procedures for project evaluation. 
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equivalent to 7% of MIUR financing4, was attributed in function of the research 
evaluation and of teaching quality. All new personnel enter the university system through 
public examinations, and career advancement also requires such public examinations. 
Salaries are regulated at the nationally centralized level and are calculated according to 
role (administrative, technical, or professorial), rank within role (for example: assistant, 
associate or full professor), and seniority. No part of the salary for professors is related to 
merit: wages increase annually according to parameters set by government. All professors 
are contractually obligated to carry out research, thus there is no development of research 
and teaching universities. The whole of these conditions has created an environment and 
culture that is completely non-competitive. 
In this completely non-competitive context, lacking incentive for improvement, we 
would expect that research performance among Italian universities will be more or less 
similar. Potential differences would be due to external factors, such as: i) economic rents 
due to location, in favor of universities situated in areas of high intensity for private 
research, where geographic proximity effect (Jaffe, 1989; Lang, 2005; Coronado and 
Acosta, 2005) would permit greater opportunities for private financing and stimuli; and 
ii) corruption in the boards of examiners for national competitions, a phenomenon that a 
succession of governments addressed through reform (Zagaria, 2007; Perotti, 2008), with 
varying degrees of earnestness but always without success, meaning that the winners of 
competitions are not always the most deserving candidates. 
Given the context, we would expect an assessment of research performance in Italian 
universities to reveal: i) a distribution of performance within universities which is 
generally highly concentrated and similar to that of the entire research population; and ii) 
a variability of average performance among universities that is less than the variability of 
performance of the individual scientists within each university. This is what we will 
attempt to verify, after having presented the methodology with which we conduct the 
study. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
National-scale comparisons of research performance at the individual level is not an 
easy task. Bibliometric techniques are apt to the scope, but few formidable obstacles need 
to be overcome, namely: i) the reconciliation of the authors’ affiliations and the 
attribution of research output to its real author, which requires an in depth knowledge of 
the research system of the country under observation; and ii) the reduction of 
performance measurement distortions due to the varying publication and citation 
intensities of the different fields of research. 
The research performance will be observed over the period 2004-2008. The field of 
observation (see Section 3.1) is composed of all researchers in the hard sciences in Italian 
universities, as indexed in an MIUR database5. Research performance will be measured 
using bibliometric techniques, as presented in Section 3.2, essentially using indicators of 
productivity, i.e. the number of publications produced; and impact, i.e. the number of 
                                                 
4 Since MIUR financing composes 55.5% of the total, the share that is distributed on the basis of the VTR 
represents 3.9% of total income. 
5 http://cercauniversita.cineca.it/php5/docenti/cerca.php 
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field standardized citations. Limiting the field of investigation to the hard sciences, the 
literature certainly gives ample justification for the choice of considering: i) scientific 
publications indexed in Web of Science™ (WoS) as proxy of overall research output 
(Moed et al., 2004); and ii) citations as proxy of impact on scientific advancement, 
notwithstanding the possible distortions inherent in these indicators (Glanzel, 2008). The 
degree of concentration of performance by the researchers in the various disciplines will 
essentially be measured using the Gini coefficient6 adjusted for small samples (Deltas, 
2003), but also through the ratio of the cumulative bottom 40% to top 20% of 
performances. 
 
 
3.1 Dataset 
 
The dataset used for the analysis is composed of the raw data, acquired from 
Thomson Reuters, of the publications (articles, reviews and conference proceedings) 
listed in the Italian National Country Report, extracted from the WoS. Based on this data, 
using a complex algorithm for reconciling the authors’ affiliation and disambiguating the 
true author identities, each publication is attributed to the university scientist(s) who 
produced it A thorough description of the algorithm may be found in D’Angelo et al. 
(2011). 
The Italian academic system provides that each researcher belongs to a specific 
Scientific Disciplinary Sector, or SDS. Each SDS is in turn part of a University 
Disciplinary Area, or UDA. The hard sciences are gathered in nine UDAs7 and 205 SDSs. 
To render greater significance, the field of observation was limited to those SDSs where 
at least 50% of member scientists produced at least one publication in the period 2004-
208. There are 184 such SDSs8. Over the period examined, these 184 SDSs contained an 
average of 39,512 scientists distributed in 77 universities (Table 1). 
 
UDA SDSs Universities Research staff 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 28 48 3,153 
Biology 19 66 5,785 
Chemistry 12 59 3,607 
Civil Engineering and architecture 7 49 1,455 
Earth sciences 12 48 1,439 
Industrial and information engineering 42 68 5,489 
Mathematics and computer sciences 9 64 3,515 
Medicine 47 55 12,196 
Physics 8 61 2,873 
Total 184 77 39,512 
Table 1: Research staff and number of SDSs per Italian UDA; data 2004-2008. 
 
 
                                                 
6 Gini coefficient is the most commonly used measure of inequality. It varies between 0, which reflects 
complete equality and 1, which indicates complete inequality (one person has all the measure, all others 
have none). 
7 Mathematics and computer sciences; physics; chemistry; earth sciences; biology; medicine; agricultural 
and veterinary sciences; civil engineering and architecture; industrial and information engineering. 
8 The complete list is provided on: 
http://www.disp.uniroma2.it/laboratorioRTT/TESTI/Indicators/ssd2.html 
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3.2 Indicators 
 
For measurement of research performance we have formulated two indicators, with 
differences in calculation according to the level of analysis: individual researchers or 
entire universities. The indicators are named productivity (P) and scientific strength (SS). 
At the level of individual researchers P is calculated as the sum of publications of an 
author, each divided by the number of co-authors9. 
The classification of university research staff into SDSs helps reduce productivity 
measurement distortions. In fact, variation of publication intensity of subfields within the 
same SDS is expected to be small enough to make productivity comparisons equitable. 
Abramo et al. (2008) noted though that a number of researchers within the same SDS 
publish in more than one WoS subject category10. This calls for a field (subject category) 
standardization, when comparing impact of researchers within the same SDS, to account 
for the varying citation intensity of different subject categories. The impact indicator 
named scientific strength (SS) is defined as the sum of the standardized citations to 
publications divided by the number of co-authors of each publication11. Citations of a 
publication are standardized dividing them by the median of citations12 of all Italian 
publications of the same year and WoS subject category13. 
Values of both indicators are averaged on the number of years in which each scientist 
was officially on staff in Italian universities over the five years under examination, so to 
have an average annual performance. 
For the analysis of performance at university level, the calculation of performance at 
SDS level is required first. At SDS level, in formulae, productivity (P) and scientific 
strength (SS) of university i in the SDS s are, respectively: 
 
 
With: 
= fraction of authors of university i in SDS s on total co-authors of publication j, 
(considering, if publication j falls in life science subject categories, the position of 
each author in the list and the character of the co-authorship, intra-mural or extra-
mural). 
Ns = total number of publications in SDS s 
= average research staff of university i in SDS s, in the observed period 
 = number of citations received by publication j 
                                                 
9 In the case of the life sciences, different weights have been given to each co-author according to his/her 
position in the list and the character of the co-authorship (intra-mural or extra-mural). 
10 Journals indexed in the WoS Science Citation Index are classified into 182 subject categories. 
11 See above footnote. 
12 Observed as of 30/06/2009. 
13 The choice to standardize citations with respect to the median value (rather than to the average, as is 
frequently observed in the literature) is justified by the fact that the distribution of citations is highly 
skewed in almost all subject categories (Lundberg, 2007). 
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= median of citations received by all Italian publications of the same year and subject 
category of publication j 
Optionally, the performance may be calculated at UDA level, aggregating 
performance data of each SDS within the UDA. To account for: i) varying publication 
and citation intensities of different SDSs and ii) differing representativeness, in terms of 
research staff, of the SDSs present in each UDA, data are conveniently: i) standardized 
and ii) weighted. At UDA level, in formulae, productivity (P) and scientific strength (SS) 
of university i in the UDA u are, respectively 
 
 
With: 
= average research staff of university i in UDA u, in the observed period 
 = number of SDSs in the UDA u 
= average value of productivity of all universities active in SDS s 
= average value of scientific strength of all universities active in SDS s 
 
The performance at university level is obtained in a similar way, aggregating 
standardized and weighted data of all SDSs in which a university is active. 
 
 
4. Results 
 
The results from the analyses are presented in the series of following subsections. First 
we present the analysis of concentration of performance by university researchers in each 
SDS and UDA at the overall Italian level, to observe potential differences among SDSs 
and UDAs. Next is an analysis at the level of single universities, to position each one in 
terms of degree of concentration of performance with respect to the overall Italian datum. 
Then we present results from the comparison between the variability of performance by 
researchers in the same discipline and university and the variability of average 
performance between universities. Finally we present the results from analysis of the 
correlation between average performance of each university and its concentration of 
performance, to understand if greater or lesser concentration can in any way be associated 
with level of performance. 
 
 
4.1 Concentration of performance of scientists 
 
In this subsection we analyze the distribution of performance by the individual 
scientists of the entire national dataset. We first quantify the degree of concentration at 
the level of the single SDSs and then of whole UDAs, to understand if and how the 
scientific performance of researchers is heterogeneous and if there are significant 
differences among SDSs and among UDAs. 
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We show the procedure used, presenting the example of SDS FIS/01 (Experimental 
physics). Over the five years from 2004-2008 this sector included 1,117 researchers 
distributed amongst 53 universities. For 133 of these (11.9% of the total), there were no 
publications registered over the period (P=0). Of the remaining 984, 60 (an additional 
5.4%) show a null SS, having produced works that received no citations. The degree of 
concentration, measured using the adjusted Gini coefficient (in the following named Gini 
coefficient, for simplicity’s sake), is 0.587 for P and 0.690 for SS. Figure 1 presents the 
Lorenz curves. It can be seen that the curves diverge notably from the diagonal, 
indicating equidistribution of performance. The ratio to the cumulative performance of 
the bottom 40% to the top 20% of all the scientists, without considering university 
affiliation, is 8.3% for P and 2.9% for SS. 
 
 
Figure 1: Lorenz curves for distributions of P and SS of university researchers in the SDS 
“Experimental physics, data 2004-2008. 
 
The next steps are the analysis of distribution of performance and the calculation of 
the relative Gini coefficients for all 184 SDSs. The descriptive statistics for the Gini 
coefficient data are depicted by the box plots for P and SS of Figure 2. The box represents 
the interquartile range (IQR), meaning the interval of observations between the first and 
third quartile (respectively indicated by the lower and upper borders of the box). The line 
that divides the box in two parts represents the median. The whiskers below and above 
the box represent the lowest datum still within 1.5 IQR of the lower quartile, and the 
highest datum still within 1.5 IQR of the upper quartile. It can be seen that the 
distribution of coefficients of concentration for P of the SDSs is symmetrical relative to 
the median (0.581), going from a minimum of 0.297. to a maximum of 0.828. The 
distribution for the concentration of SS presents a median value of 0.710 and a still more 
pronounced negative asymmetry. The minimum value is 0.156, the maximum is 0.996, 
both anomalous values compared to the totality of the data. 
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Figure 2: Box plots of Gini coefficients for P and SS in the 184 SDSs 
 
The individual coefficients of concentration measured for SDSs are now weighted for 
the share of scientists on staff in the SDS relative to the total for the UDA to which it 
belongs, thus obtaining an average value of concentration at the level of UDA for both 
measures of performance. Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the distribution of 
Gini coefficient by UDA. 
 
  Weighted mean  SDS 
UDA n. SDS of Gini coeff. min max median std dev. 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 28 0.560 0.424 0.726 0.554 0.085 
Biology 19 0.565 0.472 0.725 0.548 0.076 
Chemistry 12 0.485 0.297 0.572 0.465 0.070 
Civil Engineering and Architecture 7 0.625 0.568 0.660 0.631 0.033 
Earth sciences 12 0.556 0.455 0.689 0.540 0.069 
Industrial and Information engineering 42 0.536 0.417 0.828 0.551 0.101 
Mathematics and computer sciences 9 0.570 0.456 0.682 0.573 0.080 
Medicine 47 0.670 0.462 0.772 0.674 0.070 
Physics 8 0.548 0.469 0.777 0.539 0.093 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of Gini coefficients of P for each UDA 
 
For SS, the different areas show a value of concentration that averages higher. 
 
  Weighted mean SDS 
UDA n. SDS of Gini coeff. min max median std dev. 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 28 0.713 0.574 0.882 0.709 0.087 
Biology 19 0.682 0.559 0.827 0.684 0.063 
Chemistry 12 0.611 0.156 0.662 0.597 0.138 
Civil Engineering and architecture 7 0.769 0.677 0.819 0.768 0.046 
Earth sciences 12 0.679 0.578 0.818 0.653 0.070 
Industrial and Information engineering 42 0.704 0.540 0.996 0.712 0.101 
Mathematics and computer sciences 9 0.724 0.601 0.803 0.730 0.062 
Medicine 47 0.753 0.604 0.861 0.756 0.058 
Physics 8 0.654 0.586 0.866 0.661 0.086 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of Gini coefficients of SS for each UDA 
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The Chemistry area is notable for the lower concentration values for its SDSs, in both 
measures of performance. 
The analyses permit the conclusions that the level of concentration of performance in 
SDSs and UDAs is high for P and very high for SS, and that there are no substantial 
differences between the UDAs, in spite of the occurrence of a few outlier SDSs. 
 
 
4.2 Concentration of performance within universities 
 
In this section we analyze the distribution of performance within individual 
universities and then compare the institutions, in terms of degree of concentration, with 
what we saw in the previous section, where the distributions referred to all the national 
researchers of a given SDS without considering the institutions to which they belong. As 
an example, referring to SS, Figure 3 presents the dot plot of Gini coefficients for 
universities with researchers in SDS FIS/01. For significance reasons, analysis was 
limited to universities with at least 5 researchers in the SDS, numbering 42 in total. 
For these universities and this SDS, the degree of concentration of SS is demonstrated 
as falling around the national value, as represented by the horizontal line in Figure 3. 
Apart from a few exceptions, the greater part of universities show a Gini coefficient 
between 0.50 and 0.80. 
 
 
Figure 3: Dot plot of Gini coefficients for SS in universities with researchers in the “Experimental 
physics” SDS. 
 
Table 4 presents the details for the measurements. In addition to the Gini coefficient 
and ratio of bottom 40% to top 20%, the table shows the values for SS. The universities 
were subdivided into 4 classes in function of their level of concentration: i) very high 
inequality, Gini coefficient above 0.70; ii) high inequality, Gini 0.60-0.70; iii) moderate 
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inequality, Gini 0.50-0.60; iv) low inequality, Gini under 0.50. Each class was then 
subdivided into two sections, separating universities with an SS above the average from 
those with a below average SS. The average value of SS, for the 42 universities active in 
FIS/01, is 0.445. There are a total of only four universities in the classes “low inequality” 
and eight universities in “moderate inequality”. The greater part of the universities are 
situated in classes “high” and “very high” inequality. In this SDS it seems that there is an 
inverse relationship between the degree of concentration of performance and the value of 
performance within each university. In fact, proceeding from the low through to the very 
high inequality class, the number of universities above the average performance value for 
the sector tends to diminish. 
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 Very High inequality High inequality Moderate inequality Low inequality 
 Gini 0.70 ↑ Gini 0.60-0.70 Gini 0.50 – 0.60 Gini 0.50↓ 
 University SS Ratio GINI University SS Ratio GINI University SS Ratio GINI University SS Ratio GINI 
A
b
o
ve
 m
ea
n
 S
S
 Brescia 1.152 0.065 0.711 Milan 0.757 0.024 0.653 Milan Polytechnic 1.109 0.140 0.515 Venice - “Ca' Foscari”  0.623 0.501 0.347 
Salento 1.002 0.011 0.778 Turin Polytechnic 0.611 0.090 0.614 Trent 0.956 0.164 0.526 Marche Polytechnic 0.611 0.393 0.427 
Palermo 0.860 0.000 0.719 Milan Bicocca 0.566 0.06 0.609 Modena and Reggio E. 0.757 0.153 0.515     
Piedmont Orient.Av. 0.514 0.038 0.817     Messina 0.489 0.146 0.564      
Rome "La Sapienza" 0.498 0.019 0.736               
Ferrara 0.458 0.025 0.734                
 Superior Normal School 0.395 0.000 0.939 Naples "Federico II" 0.425 0.070 0.636 Calabria 0.365 0.093 0.596 II Napoli 0.418 0.054 0.397 
B
el
o
w
 m
ea
n
 S
S
 
Turin 0.373 0.029 0.706 Florence 0.419 0.049 0.677 Rome "Tor Vergata" 0.290 0.162 0.540 Urbino "Carlo Bo" 0.404 0.135 0.466 
Padua 0.351 0.007 0.760 Parma 0.415 0.033 0.616 Salerno 0.265 0.156 0.526      
Trieste 0.305 0.010 0.717 Aquila 0.404 0.031 0.698 Siena 0.179 0.165 0.544      
Genoa 0.268 0.002 0.831 Camerino 0.392 0.009 0.698           
Bari Polytechnic 0.224 0.000 0.867 Basilicata 0.335 0.024 0.611           
Perugia 0.213 0.003 0.774 Rome “Tre” 0.314 0.008 0.618           
Bologna 0.201 0.040 0.738 Catania 0.305 0.054 0.659           
Udine 0.135 0.010 0.854 Cagliari 0.257 0.006 0.690           
     Pisa 0.244 0.056 0.672           
     Pavia 0.228 0.078 0.641           
        Bari 0.203 0.056 0.681                 
Table 4: Scientific strength and concentration values of Italian universities in the SDS “Experimental physics”. 
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As indicated in the introduction to this article, in a context of intense competition we 
would expect to find excellent organizations with top scientists, and vice versa. Intense 
competition would lead to greater equidistribution of performance within the universities. 
On the base of this hypothesis, the authors constructed a theoretical scenario in which the 
researchers of the national SDS are divided into groups of equal numbers (1,087/42) 
within the 42 universities under examination, in function of their values of scientific 
strength. The first university is ideally assigned the group with the highest values of 
scientific strength, and so on, down to the 42nd university with the research staff of the 
lowest performance. Recalculating the Gini coefficients for the new hypothetical 
distribution, we obtain very low values, as expected (Figure 4). Except for two outliers, 
all the universities have Gini coefficients between 0 and 0.10, values that are very much 
lower than the national aggregate represented by the horizontal line in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4: Dot plot of Gini coefficients for theoretical universities with researchers of the Experimental 
physics SDS divided amongst them. 
 
For each SDS, one can measure the divergence of Gini coefficient for distribution of 
performance from that of the theoretical case. The greater is the shift, the greater is the 
distance from the “optimal” distribution of research staff among the organizations. 
The situation illustrated for this particular SDS does not differ from that of other 
SDSs in the Physics UDA or those of other UDAs. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics 
for Gini coefficient of P in each university, by UDA. The concentration of P in the 
universities varies between 0.151 in Agricultural and veterinary sciences and 1.000 (value 
registered in 7 out of 9 UDAs). All the UDAs show a median value of concentration 
above 0.40. Table 6 refers to SS: 7 out of 9 UDAs show at least one university with 
coefficient of concentration equal to one (third column). The university with the lowest 
level of concentration occurs in Industrial and information engineering (0.164). 
Chemistry shows a distribution of Gini coefficients with the lowest values for median 
(0.547) and maximum (0.844). 
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 Universities 
UDA min max median std dev. 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 0.151 1.000 0.536 0.166 
Biology 0.166 1.000 0.543 0.153 
Chemistry 0.162 0.712 0.443 0.107 
Civil Engineering and architecture 0.186 1.000 0.623 0.152 
Earth sciences 0.179 1.000 0.528 0.166 
Industrial and Information engineering 0.126 1.000 0.505 0.161 
Mathematics and computer sciences 0.240 1.000 0.564 0.146 
Medicine 0.257 1.000 0.653 0.143 
Physics 0.237 0.927 0.536 0.136 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics for Gini coefficient of P for the universities active in each UDA 
 
 Universities 
UDA min max median std dev. 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 0.181 1.000 0.669 0.168 
Biology 0.222 1.000 0.646 0.152 
Chemistry 0.195 0.844 0.547 0.123 
Civil Engineering and architecture 0.339 1.000 0.770 0.151 
Earth sciences 0.167 1.000 0.661 0.185 
Industrial and Information engineering 0.164 1.000 0.661 0.164 
Mathematics and computer sciences 0.378 1.000 0.711 0.132 
Medicine 0.257 1.000 0.727 0.136 
Physics 0.279 0.939 0.618 0.137 
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for Gini coefficient of SS for the universities active in each UDA 
 
In summary, the distribution of performance within universities is generally highly 
concentrated. The true situation is very far from the theoretical and optimal case, in 
which all universities have an almost equidistributed performance. This confirms the 
expected effects of a non-competitive environment, where in the absence of top 
universities able to attract the best researchers, these distribute more or less uniformly 
among the institutions, giving a situation of high concentration of performance. 
 
 
4.3 Comparison of performance variability within and between universities 
 
In a competitive environment we expect that the variability of performance by 
researchers within universities will be less than that between universities. The more the 
environment is competitive, the more the difference should be. In a non-competitive 
environment we expect the opposite. 
This section presents the results of the analysis of the variability of performance 
within universities and between universities in Italy. As an example, we provide the 
analyses for P in the Physics UDA and for SS in Civil engineering and architecture. For 
the variability measure we use the coefficient of variation expressed as percentage, so as 
to compare the variability between distributions with different average values. 
In Physics, the level of variability of performance within individual universities, is 
greater than the variability between them. In Figure 5, the horizontal line represents the 
value of variability among universities, which is situated under all the individual points, 
which represent individual universities. The coefficients of variation within universities 
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range from 43% to 162%, while the value between them is 33%. 
 
 
Figure 5: Coefficients of variation for P within Italian universities (points) in Physics compared with the 
coefficient between universities (line). 
 
The situation described for Physics is repeated in all the other UDAs. Table 7 presents 
descriptive statistics for distributions of the coefficients of variation within the 
universities in each UDA. Comparing with the variation between universities, we see 
that, apart from the Civil engineering and architecture UDA, there is no UDA where a 
university presents variability for performance that is less than that between. The highest 
median for variability is seen in Medicine (143%) and the lowest is in Chemistry (89%). 
 
 CV within CV between 
UDA min max median  
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 35% 165% 110% 32% 
Biology 49% 237% 110% 35% 
Chemistry 57% 164% 89% 22% 
Civil engineering and architecture 57% 186% 123% 59% 
Earth sciences 53% 163% 98% 37% 
Industrial and Information engineering 53% 161% 101% 30% 
Mathematics and computer sciences 54% 168% 111% 37% 
Medicine 53% 209% 143% 41% 
Physics 43% 162% 104% 33% 
Table 7: Coefficients of variation for SS within and between Italian universities. 
 
The same considerations hold true for SS. Giving the example of Civil engineering 
and architecture, we see that all the universities active in the UDA, except one, show 
variability that is greater than that between universities (Figure 6). 
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Figure 6: Coefficients of variation per SS within (points) and between (line) Italian universities. 
 
The individual universities hold values of between 74% and 346%, while variability 
among them is 85%. The Biology UDA shows one university with dispersion of 
performance lower than that between universities. However, all other UDAs conform to 
the observation that variability of performance within universities is always greater than 
that between (Table 8). The UDA with the lowest and greatest median values of 
dispersion for SS are, respectively, Chemistry (125%) and Medicine (190%). 
 
 CV within CV between 
UDA min max median  
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 81% 245% 159% 44% 
Biology 54% 297% 159% 58% 
Chemistry 71% 303% 125% 33% 
Civil engineering and architecture 74% 346% 160% 85% 
Earth sciences 61% 236% 129% 58% 
Industrial and Information engineering 74% 267% 161% 37% 
Mathematics and computer sciences 87% 295% 159% 55% 
Medicine 68% 313% 190% 59% 
Physics 51% 204% 136% 45% 
Table 8: Comparison of coefficients of variation for SS within and between universities. 
 
The results described thus show that the variability of performance between 
universities is less than variability of performance of individual scientists within each 
Italian university, confirming expectations, given the non-competitive environment. In 
the Italian university system there is a flattening of the average level of performance of 
universities, due to the high concentration of performance of researchers within each 
university. 
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4.4 Degree of concentration and average level of performance 
 
From the preceding analyses it emerges that degree of concentration of performance 
within Italian universities is generally high or very high and greater than that between 
them. In this section we test whether the values of concentration of each university are or 
are not correlated with the values for performance. We test at the levels of the single 
UDA and globally. 
Applying the Spearman non-parametric coefficient of correlation at the level of UDA, 
between P and the relative degree of concentration, we obtain significant correlations in 6 
UDAs out of 9 (Table 9). Apart from Chemistry, correlation is always negative. The 
highest value of correlation (ρ = -0.606, p-value <0.01) is seen in Medicine. In this UDA 
highly productive universities show on average a very low concentration of performance 
at individual level. This can be due to the specificity of the “research production 
function” in this UDA. In medicine, team-work is practically the norm, while in other 
disciplines, such as mathematics, is much less so. A large quota of collaborations occur 
mainly intramuros, so that if a team is highly productive on average, all of its members 
are highly productive as well, and viceversa. Anyway, concerning SS, the correlation is 
significant in 4 UDAs. In this case again, the only positive correlation occurs in 
Chemistry, but with p-value >0.10, therefore not statistically significant. 
 
UDA P vs Gini P SS vs Gini SS 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences -0.262 -0.113 
Biology -0.393*** -0.244** 
Chemistry +0.110 +0.191 
Civil Engineering and architecture -0.398** -0.113 
Earth sciences -0.287* -0.202 
Industrial and Information engineering -0.106 -0.147 
Mathematics and computer sciences -0.495*** -0.223* 
Medicine -0.606*** -0.618*** 
Physics -0.365*** -0.330** 
Table 9: Spearman correlation between P, SS and Gini coefficients 
Significance level: *p-value <0.10, **p-value<0.05,***p-value<0.01. 
 
Testing for global correlation (without distinguishing by UDA), we obtain a 
significant and negative correlation for both indicators of performance. The highest 
correlation is obtained for the correlation of P and the relative degree of concentration (ρ 
= -0.293, p-value < 0.01), while that for SS is lower (ρ = -0.182, p-value < 0.01). 
The negative relationship between performance and relative concentration, even 
though not high in some disciplines, is confirmed by the comparison of concentration 
between the best and worst universities in terms of performance. Two subgroups were 
created for this test: the first consisting of the universities in the top 10% for performance 
in their sectors, for every disciplinary area, and the second group consisting of the bottom 
10%. 
The analysis shows that the average level of concentration for both measures of 
performance is less within the top 10% subgroup than in the bottom 10% group (Table 
10). There is thus less dispersion of performance within the best universities, although it 
is still high. The only exception is the Chemistry UDA, where the situation is completely 
reversed (note that the coefficients of correlation were positive). This result is not 
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completely surprising: unlike the other UDAs, Chemistry has a very low average value of 
unproductive researchers, at 6%, which dictates a greater equidistribution of productivity 
among its researchers. Also, the Earth sciences UDA shows, limited to SS, a 
concentration of performance in the top 10% that is greater than in the bottom 10%. 
Chemistry, for P, and Earth sciences, for SS, show the lowest levels of concentration 
among all the UDAs. 
 
 Average Gini P Average Gini SS 
UDA Top 10% Bottom 10% Top 10% Bottom 10% 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 0.467 0.475 0.591 0.650 
Biology 0.491 0.512 0.540 0.559 
Chemistry 0.415 0.394 0.516 0.437 
Civil Engineering and architecture 0.505 0.648 0.583 0.700 
Earth sciences 0.479 0.560 0.474 0.341 
Industrial and information engineering 0.447 0.451 0.582 0.673 
Mathematics and computer sciences 0.446 0.536 0.598 0.634 
Medicine 0.435 0.623 0.578 0.710 
Physics 0.452 0.525 0.522 0.589 
Table 10: A comparison of Gini coefficients for P and SS between top 10% and bottom 10% universities 
in each UDA 
 
The results are confirmed by the NPC test, a combination of non-parametric tests for 
comparison between groups, stratified by UDA (Pesarin, 2001). The test is for GINItop10% 
= GINIbottom10%, against the alternative hypothesis that GINItop10% < GINIbottom10% , both 
globally and within each UDA. The combined Fisher test shows significant differences 
between the two groups, both for P (p-value = 0.005 < 0.01) and for SS (p-value = 0.034 
< 0.05) (last line of Table 11): the concentration of the top 10% is on average less than 
the concentration of the bottom 10%. 
Examining the different UDAs, significant differences in the levels of concentration 
of P are seen only in Medicine and in Civil engineering and architecture (both with p-
value < 0.05), and in Mathematics and computer sciences (p-value < 0.10). For levels of 
concentration of SS, significant differences appear in Medicine (p-value < 0.05) and in 
the engineering areas (Table 11). 
 
 
Table 11: NPC test, stratified by UDA and combined 
 
 p-value  
UDA Gini P Gini SS 
Agricultural and veterinary sciences 0.454 0.448 
Biology 0.372 0.386 
Chemistry 0.640 0.960 
Civil Engineering and architecture 0.014 0.074 
Earth sciences 0.167 0.790 
Industrial and Information engineering 0.485 0.083 
Mathematics and computer sciences 0.089 0.247 
Medicine 0.021 0.013 
Physics 0.171 0.226 
Combined test using the Fisher combination 0.005 0.034 
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5. Conclusions 
 
The Italian higher education system presents levels of concentration of performance 
within universities that are high or very high, and greater than that between them. This 
situation should be typical of non-competitive university systems, which do not favor the 
search for a sustainable competitive advantage, with the resulting formation of 
outstanding institutions, capable of attracting, developing and retaining the top scientists 
from the nation and from abroad. Dispersion of performance may thus reveal an 
important indicator of intensity of competitiveness in higher education systems. The 
implications at the level of national and institutional policies can not be ignored. In non-
competitive systems like the Italian one, the allocation of a part of public resources to 
individual universities on the basis of results from national exercises of evaluation, which 
compare the average performance of the universities, could result as having little 
effective use. If the intent of the policy-maker is that of optimizing the socio-economic 
impact of public financing for research, through allocating greater resources to 
universities that have a higher average efficiency, the high dispersion of performance 
within universities leaves open the risk that the macroeconomic objective will not be 
reached, unless the universities internally allocate the resources according to similar 
principles of merit. This risk is much less in competitive systems, where the variability of 
performance within is much less than between universities. In this case, allocation of 
resources to excellent universities is more or less equivalent to allocating resources to the 
best scientists. In non-competitive systems, as in the Italian case, it is unlikely that the 
universities will have the capacity, even if they have the desire, to identify the best 
research products, and thus the best scientists. Abramo et al. (2009) have in fact 
demonstrated the limited effectiveness of Italian universities in selecting their best 
research products for the last national exercise for evaluation of research. An immediate 
policy recommendation is thus that national evaluation exercises be conducted at the 
level of the individual, at least in the hard sciences where bibliometric techniques make 
this possible, in order to inform universities’ internal selective funding. 
Even if there is efficient allocation at the level of individuals, the authors remain 
skeptical that when the share of financing based on merit is very small (as in the Italian 
case) and without an accompanying incentive systems linking salaries to merit, this 
would then lead to significant increments in production efficiency or to efficient selection 
that is typical of competitive systems, replacing deeply-rooted practices of favoritism. In 
the current economy of knowledge, in order that this be realized with the urgency that the 
current global competitive challenges require, a more daring policy recommendation by 
the authors is that of favoring the budding of spin-off universities, possibly with balanced 
regional distribution, and with in-migration of only the top scientists from the national 
public research system. With a very low investment, for the marginal costs of transfers, it 
would be possible to quickly create the type of top universities that competitive systems 
in other national contexts have produced over the span of decades: universities capable of 
attracting the best scientists, students and enterprises to the region, and leading to much 
greater economic benefit than the present universities, with their high dispersion of 
internal performance, are able to produce. 
A further consideration concerns the line of research which focuses on comparisons of 
research performance of national systems (such as May, 1997; King, 2004; Dosi et al., 
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2006). These comparisons, which among other factors usually omit to carry out field-
standardizations, are based on the measure of central tendency, without delving into how 
data is dispersed. Two higher education systems with the same average research 
performance could have impacts on national socio-economic development that are 
completely different, all others equal, according to the dispersion of performance within 
each institution. A measure of dispersion is thus just as important as that of central 
tendency in international comparison of research systems. Finally, international rankings 
of universities, such as Thes14, which also base their results on measurements from 
perceptions of the universities’ reputations, are inappropriate in non-competitive national 
systems. For these, the dispersion of performance within the universities is so high that 
there is no emergence of the type of top university seen in competitive systems, thus 
making it difficult to perceive strong differences in performance between the universities, 
which in fact, as this study demonstrates, do not exist. 
It is the hope of the authors that colleagues from other national contexts carry out 
similar studies and provide data on the dispersion of performance in other countries as 
well. Further analyses, on this stream of research, may concern the impact of structural 
variables such as size, geographical location, etc. on the concentration of performance. 
Furthermore, time-series analysis of levels of performance concentration may reveal the 
effectiveness of policies aimed at stimulating more competition in higher education 
systems. 
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